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In the 21
st century most countries in the world will experience a substantial ageing of 
their populations. This population ageing is due to a general decline in birth rates 
both in the developed world—from moderate to low levels of fertility—and in 
developing countries—from high to moderate levels. Some long-term projections 
show truly daunting ageing figures. If fertility rates remain very low, as they are 
today, and we continue to experience improvements in life expectancy, half of the 
population in today's industrialised countries is projected to be above age 60 in the 
late 21st century. Many developing countries, such as China, will be hit even harder, 
since fertility rates have fallen so rapidly in recent years. In a few decades, China 
must accommodate to an old-age burden that is about the same as that in Western 
Europe today.1  
What impact will population ageing have on economic development? 
Basically, ageing means that a society attains a higher old age dependency rate. The 
share of old aged, that is dependent on the working population, increases. Many 
observers argue that this increase in the old age dependency rate is a severe threat to 
the future wealth of Western societies. In a few years, Europe and Japan will be 
                                          
1  W. Lutz, W. Sanderson, S. Scherbov and A. Goujon, ”World Population Scenarios for the 21st Century”, in W. Lutz   2
facing substantial labour shortages, and in the longer run, there is a risk that 
stagnating – or diminishing – populations will be unable to finance social security 
and old age care for a growing share of retired citizens. In a broader perspective, 
population ageing might affect international relations and the world political order. If 
population ageing results in economically weaker Western states, new and 
economically more powerful centres might emerge.2 
In this essay, we argue that one way to approach the challenge of 
population ageing is to analyse the consequences of age structure changes in the 
past. In fact, dramatic changes in the age structure are not a new phenomenon. 
Every country that has entered the demographic transition – in some cases 200 
years ago or more – has also experienced a prolonged period of substantial age 
structure change. With more systematic knowledge about these past changes, we 
will be better prepared to deal with future demographic challenges. 
This essay is, in the main, an explorative contribution to the ongoing 
debate about the role of population in economic development. We discuss why it is 
reasonable to expect that age structure matters to economic and social development, 
and to what extent, and in what ways, this assumption is confirmed by empirical 
data. We have chosen Sweden as our main empirical example, since it is a country 
with a long series of detailed population statistics.3 Furthermore, Sweden provides a 
rather typical pattern of long-term age structure change. In fact, the stylised model 
of the demographic transition, taught today in demography classes, was originally 
                                                                                                                                    
(ed.), The Future Population of the World. What Can We Assume Today?, London, 1996, p. 382-386. 
2  For example P. G. Peterson, Gray dawn : how the coming age wave will transform America - and the world, New 
York, 1999; World population prospects: the 1998 revision, United Nations, New York, 1999. 
3 All Swedish population figures in the following are based on official statistics, from 1857 to 1912 in the series BiSOS 
(Bidrag till Sveriges officiella statistik), and for the period thereafter in the series SOS (Sveriges officiella statistik). 
For a valuable compilation, see Statistics Sweden, Population development in Sweden in a 250-year 
perspective, Demografiska rapporter 1999:2, Table 1.2 ”Population by sex and age 1750-1998”.   3
based on Swedish data. Our treatment of the Swedish case will be related to a 
comparative framework. In our comparative surveys, we build on historical as well 
as contemporary examples. 
In recent years, students of demography have focused mainly on gross 
population growth, while the problem of long-term changes in the age structure has 
attracted less attention. In consequence, the demographic transition model has been 
formulated in terms of (gross) death and birth rates. The analysis has focussed on 
the impact of the transition on the rate of population growth. According to this 
classic analysis, the rate of population growth is low as long as both birth and death 
rates are on a high level. When the death rate begins to fall, without any 
corresponding decline in the birth rate, the population starts to grow. Eventually, as 
the birth rate falls to the low levels typical of modern, industrialised societies, the 
rate of population growth is once again reduced.4   
The impact of the demographic transition on population growth is 
important indeed. However, if we turn our attention away from general population 
growth towards age structure, we will soon observe that the impact of the 
demographic transition on age structure is equally strong as its impact on population 
growth. Furthermore, the effects on age structure are more extended in time. In the 
wake of the demographic transition, an age transition follows. This age transition 
consists of four distinctive phases, marked by the increase of one specific age 
group. First comes a child phase, then a young adult phase, thereafter a phase of 
population maturity, and finally a phase of ageing. 5 
                                          
4 For overviews, see J-C. Chesnais, The Demographic Transition. Stages, Patterns, and Economic Implications. A 
Longitudinal Study of Sixty-Seven Countries Covering the Period 1720-1984, New York, 1992; and M. Livi-Bacci, A 
concise history of world population, Cambridge, MA, 1997. 
5 D. E. Bloom och J. G. Williamson, ”Demographic Transitions and Economic Miracles in Emerging Asia”, The World 
Bank Economic Review, 1998, vol 12, nr 3; B. Malmberg and L. Sommestad, Historiens dolda puls.   4
The first phase of the age transition, the child phase, occurs when falling 
death rates during the initial stage of the demographic transition produce an increase 
in the number of children. The reason for this increase in the number of children is 
that in high-mortality populations, most of those who die are infants and children. A 
reduction of mortality therefore primarily spares the lives of them. Furthermore, as 
the cohorts who survive into adulthood become larger, the fertile population will 
soon grow as well, and, with unchanged fertility behaviour, this will further increase 
the number of children born. In consequence, some 30-40 years after a fall in 
mortality, the age structure of a population with unchanged fertility behaviour will 
assume the concave pyramid shape that is so typical of countries that experience 
high rates of natural population growth. From a macro-economic point of view, the 
child phase is a period when consumption needs tend to exceed productive 
capacity. The child dependency rate is high, and women in particular need to invest 
substantial financial and temporal resources in the sphere of reproduction. 6 
When fertility rates start to decline, this picture changes dramatically. 
Most countries that undergo a demographic transition do in fact not only experience 
a fall in the rate of fertility, but also a reduction in the total number of children born. 
This reduction creates a bulge in the age structure; a bulge built up by the cohorts 
that were born just before the absolute birth rate started to fall. The classic 
population pyramid gradually changes its appearance: the base gets narrower and 
the pyramid attains an increasingly convex shape. 
                                                                                                                                    
Befokningsutveckling och samhällsutveckling i Sverige 1820-1995,  manuscript, presented at the research seminar 
at the Department of Economic History, Uppsala University, april 1997; B. Malmberg och M. Lundmark, 
”Befolkningsgeografi - en bortglömd pusselbit”, Svensk geografisk årsbok, 1998, vol. 74. 
6  A. F. Robertson, Beyond the Family. The Social Organisation of Human Reproduction, Cambridge, MA, 1991, 
chapter 3; ; L. Sommestad, ”Welfare State Attitudes to the Male Breadwinning System: The United States and 
Sweden in Comparative Perspective”, International Review of Social History, vol. 42, 1997 Supplement.   5
In the traditional model, this fall in the birth rate is the last phase of the 
demographic transition. However, the age transition is far from completed at this 
stage. The reason is simple. A population that has developed a bulge in its age 
composition will be continuously transformed for as long as it takes for the bulge to 
pass through the entire age structure. The second stage in the age transition, the 
young adult phase, is attained when the bulge passes through the young adult ages. 
Later the bulge will pass through the Middle Ages, which marks the third phase, the 
phase of maturity. Still later, more than 60 years after the onset of the fertility 
decline, the bulge will enter the older age groups. All in all, a society that experiences 
an age transition goes through remarkably predictable demographic phases, from the 
initial challenge of high child dependency rates up to the closing phase of maturing 
and finally ageing. 
In Swedish data, the different phases of the age transition are quite easy 
to identify, as demonstrated in figure 1. The first phase, associated with an 
increasing number of children, started in the early 19
th century and continued to the 
First World War. The second phase, with an expansion of the young adults, started 
around 1840 and continued into the inter-war years. The third phase with an 
expanding middle aged population started in the 1870s and continued up to the 
1960s. A fourth phase with an expanding old age population started in the early 20
th 
century and continued up to the 1990s. Still today the bulge created by the 
demographic transition is clearly visible, but now we have to look at the very oldest 
age groups, above 80 years of age, to find the bulge cohorts. The age transition in 
Sweden is, thus, an almost two hundred year long event. 
   6
Figure 1. Sweden's population 1800-2000, by age groups (in thousands) 
   
FIGURE 1 
 
Source: Statistics Sweden, Population development in Sweden in a 250-year 
perspective, Demografiska rapporter 1999:2, Table 1.2 ”Population by sex 
and age 1750-1998”.  
The process of age structure change, that follows a demographic transition, is 
important for two reasons. First, the distinctive phases of the age transition makes it 
possible to analyse in what ways age structure matters to social and economic 
development. If age structure has a systematic impact on economic development, 
we should be able to observe similarities between countries that pass through the 
same phase of the age transition.  
Second, the regular pattern of the age transition points to similarities in 
historical experience, across time and space. Regions in the world have experienced 
the demographic transition at different points in time, and with varying intensity, but 
once the demographic transition is under way, different regions tend to pass through 
the four phases of the age transition in roughly the same way. 
In the following, we will discuss the impact of age structure on historical 
development in three steps. First we ask if there are theoretical reasons to expect 
that an increase of certain age groups will have economic and social effects that are 
visible on a macro level. Second, we adopt a largely inductive strategy to find out if 
more children, more young adults, more middle aged, or more old people might 
have any distinctive effects on the development of a country. To do this we ask if 
countries that are in the same phase of the age transition do have certain   7
characteristics in common. Finally, we discuss the age-structure approach in relation 
to broader scholarly debates about population and economic development.7  
The theoretical reason to expect that age structure matters to economic 
development is the existence of an economic life cycle that strongly influences the 
behaviour of people as they go from childhood to adulthood and old age. From this 
follows that a population might create very different economic conditions, 
depending on which age group that predominates population growth: children, 
adults or the old aged. 8   
Most important, from a life cycle perspective, is the indisputable fact 
that an individual's productive capacity varies over the life cycle. Newborn humans 
are unable to survive without the support of older, more able-bodied custodians. 
Many years of care, education and training are needed before children have acquired 
the productive potential of an average adult. Similarly, when people grow older, their 
individual productive capacity tends to decrease, until it finally falls short of what 
they need for survival. Towards the end of life, we are often as helpless as we were 
as newborn babies. By contrast, most adults have a capacity to produce more than 
they need for their own immediate survival. They are not only able to support 
themselves, but they also typically act as providers. Moreover, in the course of the 
life cycle, people acquire experience, and they also tend to build up savings. In 
consequence, middle aged people are often richer in resources that younger adults. 
All in all, the youngest and the oldest members of a society constitute an economic 
                                          
7 It should be noted here that we will not go into the very interesting question of what caused the mortality and 
fertility decline. This major issue in the field of historical demography is too extensive to be discussed here. Instead, 
we will take the age transition as a datum and concentrate on the possible effects of this transition. 
8  The economic theory of the life cycle was first developed by Franco Modigliani to explain individual patterns of 
consumption and savings (1954). It is an important contribution to micro economics. See F. Modigliani, ”The life cycle 
hypothesis of saving twenty years later”, In M. Parkin and A.R. Nobays (eds.) Contemporary issues in economics, 
Manchester, 1975; and P. Kouri. ”Franco Modigliani´s  contribution to economics”, The  Scandinavian Journal of 
Economics, 1986, vol. 88, nr 2, p. 311-334.   8
burden, while working adults – and in particular the middle aged – produce the 
surplus on which economic growth and development depend. 
So let us turn, first, to the child phase, the period of child abundance 
that initiates the age transition. England was among the first countries in the world to 
enter this phase of rapid population growth and child abundance. This happened 
around 1800, in the time of Malthus, whose influential – and largely pessimistic –
 analyses of population growth was based on this very experience.9 As regards our 
main case, Sweden, the most clear-cut effects of an increasing number of children 
can be found somewhat later, from the 1820s. At this time, Sweden entered the 
demographic transition, and with declining mortality rates, larger cohorts of children 
survived.  
In a comparative context, Sweden entered the age transition at an early 
stage. In most other parts of the world, the child phase did not occur until the 20th 
century. Many Asian states experienced the child phase in the 1960s. A well-known 
example is India. Today, populations with an age structure that resembles England’s 
around 1800 or Sweden’s in the early 19
th century are found in particular in sub-
Saharan Africa. Here, the share of children in the population typically exceeds 40 
percent. These are the highest figures ever registered for countries that pass through 
this first phase of the age transition.10 
If one were asked to enumerate characteristics common to child 
abundant countries, such as Sweden in the 19th century, a first observation to be 
made is that child abundance is closely related to poverty. In Sweden, the period 
from the 1830s up to the early 1870s was marked by recurring political struggles 
                                          
9 E. A. Wrigley and R. S. Schofield, The population history of England 1541-1871: a reconstruction, London, 1989, 
chapter 8 and table A9.1. 
10  United Nations, Global Estimates and Projections of Populations by Sex and Age: the 1994 revision, United   9
around ”the poverty question”. Contemporary evidence tells the story of a country 
challenged by an unexpected population growth and alarming signs of disintegration 
and destitution.11 The connection between children and rural poverty in 19th century 
Sweden is confirmed by the fact that the share of children (0-14 years of age) in 
Swedish counties around 1870 is strongly correlated with the poverty rate (defined 
as the share of adults unable to pay taxes). A statistical analysis shows that a one- 
percent increase in the share of children corresponds to a 2.5 percent increase in the 
poverty rate. The share of children explains slightly more than 50 percent of the 
regional variation in poverty.12 Today, this close relationship between child 
abundance and poverty can be found again in many parts of the world, not least in 
sub-Saharan Africa. The sub-Saharan African states have at present remarkably high 
child dependency rates, and these countries are also among the poorest in the 
world.13  
Another characteristic feature of child abundant economies is the 
occurrence of child labour, a phenomenon clearly connected to the state of 
poverty.14 In Sweden, child labour was widespread during the child phase, and 
                                                                                                                                    
Nations, New York, 1994.  
11 S. Oredsson, ”Samhällelig eller enskild fattigvård? En linje i debatten inför 1871 års fattigvårdslagstiftning”, 
Scandia 1971, vol. 37; B. Petersson, ”Den farliga underklassen”. Studier i fattigdom och brottslighet i 1800-talets 
Sverige, Umeå 1983, p. 16-88. Similar observations of disintegration and destitution have been made in many other 
countries, that pass through the child phase. A typical example is A. Mager, ”Migrancy, Marriage and the discourse 
of ‘family breakdown’ in a South African bantustan, 1945-1959”, paper presented at the 12th International Economic 
History Congress, Madrid, Spain, August 1998. 
12 Statistical analysis based on data on rural poverty (the poverty rate) from O. Lundsjö, Fattigdomen på den 
svenska landsbygden under 1800-talet, Stockholm, 1975, table 29, p. 134 (share of poor people in relation to the total 
population above 18 years of age) and G. Sundbärg, ”Ekonomisk-statistisk beskrivning öfver Sveriges olika 
landsdelar”, in Emigrationsutredningen. Bilaga 5. Bygdestatistik, Stockholm 1910, table 32. We have chosen to 
analyse data from 1871, since this is a year when data are available from all Swedish counties. The definition of 
poverty as the inability to pay taxes is discussed by Lundsjö (ibid.), p. 38-60. 
13 D. E. Bloom, och J. D. Sachs., ”Geography, Demography and Economic Growth in Africa”, Brooking Papers on 
Economic Activity 1998:2. 
14 H. Cunningham and P. P. Viazzo (eds.), Child Labour in Historical Perspective 1800-1985: Case Studies From 
Europe, Japan and Colombia, Unicef, 1996; N. de Coninck-Smith, B. Sandin and E. Schrumpf (eds.), Industrious 
Children. Work and Childhood in the Nordic Countries 1850-1990, Odense, 1997.    10
regional analyses indicate that the incidence of child labour peaked in different 
regions when the share of children in the population was at the heighest.15 The 
demographic transition in Sweden started in the south, in the first half of the 19th 
century, and as the number of children rose in this part of the country, the incidence 
of child labour appears to have risen as well. For example, child labour in Swedish 
urban industry, that was mostly located in the south, peaked in the 1850s. In 
northern Sweden, by contrast, where the child phase occurred later, child labour 
continued to exist well into the 20th century. Northern children worked within 
agriculture and lumbering, but also in the sawmill industry.16 Today, when child 
labour is no longer an issue in Sweden and other ageing countries, child labour has 
instead become very important in poor countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America, 
where child dependency rates are still high. As could be expected, the highest 
activity rates are found in sub-Saharan Africa. Here, more than 30 percent of 
children aged 10-14 years are consiedered part of the labour force. The highest 
incidence of child labour is registered in Burkina Faso, where 59 percent of children 
aged 10 to 14 are included in the economically active population.17 
A third characteristic feature of child abundant countries is a strong 
dependence on the exploitation of natural resources. In Sweden, the devastation of 
forestland spread from the south towards the north during the child phase, but an 
even more conspicuous phenomenon, was the intense process of land reclamation. 
                                          
15 Hitherto, the possible relationship between the age composition of the population on the one hand, and child 
labour on the other, has not been much discussed. An important exception is the analysis of labour scarcity, due to 
emigration, and child labour in M. Sjöberg, Att säkra framtidens skördar. Barndom, skola och arbete i agrar miljö: 
Bolstad pastorat 1860-1930, Linköping 1996, p. 127-129.  
16 E-L Bjurman and L. Olsson, Barnarbete och arbetarbarn, Stockholm, 1979; A. Johansson, Arbetets delning: 
Stocka sågverk, s. 340-352; L. Olsson, Då barn var lönsamma. Om arbetsdelning, barnarbete och teknologiska 
förändringar i några svenska industrier under 1800-talet och början av 1900-talet, Malmö, 1995 (second printing), 
chapter 6; and L. Sommestad, Sågverksarbetarna i strukturomvandlingen, Gävle, 1982, p. 90-91. 
17 Economically active population, vol. II (Africa) and vol. V (World), STAT Working papers, Bureau of Statistics, 
International Labour Office (ILO), Geneva, 1997; and J. Boyden, What works for working children, Stockholm, 1998.   11
In order to secure the survival of a growing number of children and young families, 
all available natural resources were utilised. In Sweden, the cultivated area roughly 
doubled during the early phase of the age transition, from 1820 to 1865. It reached a 
maximum around 1920, a point in time when the number of children was at its 
height. In the 19th century, land was reclaimed in particular in southern Sweden, 
where the demographic transition first set in. Later, the focus shifted towards the 
north, where land reclamation continued well into the 1950s. In this late period, 
available data confirm the hypothesis that land reclamation was closely related to the 
age structure of the population.18 Today, land reclamation is still in full swing in 
many rapidly growing, child abundant populations, for example in sub-Saharan 
Africa. Between 1980 and 1996 land reclamation was particularly intense in West 
Africa, with increases between 20 and 40 percent in the share of arable land in 
countries like Gabon, Guinea, Burkina Faso, Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire.19 In Africa 
today, as well as in Sweden in the nineteenth century, intense exploitation of natural 
resources has followed by environmental devastation, such as soil erosion and 
destruction of forestland.20  
Finally, child abundant countries are dependent on foreign capital. In the 
Swedish case, the entire child phase, from the 1820s up to the First World War, 
                                          
18 Counties with a large share of children among their inhabitants, such as the northern counties of Västerbotten and 
Norrbotten, tended to reclaim more land than counties with a more mature age composition. In R. Backman, 
Demografin bakom Sveriges barnarbete, Essay, C-level, Department of Economic history, Uppsala university, 1997; 
D. Bäcklund, I industrisamhällets utkant. Småbrukets omvandling i Lappmarken 1870-1970, Umeå, 1988, chapter 
10; D. Hannerberg, Svenskt agrarsamhälle under 1200 år, Stockholm, 1971, p. 28-31, s 79; B. Hansson, ”Hur 
användes marken?”, i Jordbruket, Sveriges Nationalatlas, Höganäs, 1992, p. 26-27; G. Utterström, Jordbrukets 
arbetare. Levnadsvillkor och arbetsliv på landsbygden från frihetstiden till mitten av 1800-talet, Stockholm, 1957, 
p. 709-717. 
19 World Bank, World Development Indicators, 1999, table 3.1. 
20 For exploitation of natural resources and environmental degradation in Sweden, see for example G. Fridlizius, 
Swedish Corn Export in the Free Trade Era, Lund, 1957; E. Söderlund, Svensk trävaruexport under hundra år, 
Stockholm, 1951, p 31-40, 46-49; and N. Edling, ”Staten, Norrlandsfrågan och den organiserade kapitalismen”, 
Historisk tidskrift, 1994, nr 2. Local environmental devastation due to poverty in developing countries today is dealt 
with in P. Dasgupta, ”The Environmental Resource Base and Human Welfare”, in K. Lindahl-Kiessling and H.   12
was marked by capital imports. Lennart Schön has shown that Sweden’s current 
account was negative for 60 years, from the 1850s up to the 1910s. By 1910, 
Sweden was probably one of the most indebted nations in the world. The estimated 
debt amounted to 75 percent of GNP.21 A similar correspondence between age 
structure and the dependence on foreign capital has been observed for several 
countries in the 20th century as well.22 
To sum up, empirical evidence indicates that the first phase in the age 
transition, the child phase, is characterised primarily by scarce resources, or 
poverty. In relation to this basic condition, other characteristic features stand out, 
such as child labour, an intense exploitation of natural resources, and dependence 
on foreign capital. These characteristic features of child abundant societies fit well 
with expectations. From a life cycle perspective, childhood is a period of life when 
the productive capacity of individuals falls short of their consumption needs. 
However, due to the predominance of young people, child abundant societies are 
also clearly oriented towards the future. Survival strategies, such as land 
reclamation, reveal a strong ambition to work hard in order to secure the well being 
of new generations. This prospective spirit becomes even more marked when we 
turn to the next phase in the age transition, the young adult phase. 
In Sweden, the young adult phase started in the 1840s and continued –
 with some delay during the period of emigration – to about 1930/40 (the figure 1 
above). The most clear-cut period of youth increase lasted from the 1890s to about 
                                                                                                                                    
Landberg (eds.) Population, Economic Development, and the Environment, Oxford, 1994. 
21 Lennart Schön, Omvandling och obalans. Appendix 3 to Långtidsutredningen 1994, Stockholm, 1994, p. 47-54.  
22T. T. Herbertsson and G. Zoega, ”Trade Surpluses and Life-Cycle Saving Behaviour”, Economics Letters, 
November 1999; M. Higgins, och J. G. Williamson, "Age Structure Dynamics in Asia and Dependence on Foreign 
Capital", Population and Development Review, vol. 23, June 1997, no 2; T. Lindh och B. Malmberg, ”Age 
Distributions and the Current Account – a Changing Relation?”, working paper 1999:21, Department of Economics, 
Uppsala University; and A. M. Taylor, "External Dependence, Demographic Burdens, and Argentine Economic 
Decline After the Belle Epoque", Journal of Economic History, vol. 52, 1992, no. 4.    13
1940. In these decades, when emigration finally came to an end, Sweden 
experienced a continuous growth of the young population. 
The young adult period in Sweden is strongly associated with 
modernisation. This was a time of agricultural transformation, liberalisation, railway 
building, emigration, urbanisation, industrialisation, popular movements, and, 
towards the end of the period, rapidly falling birth rates. New industries emerged, 
international trade developed, and financial markets boomed – and collapsed. 
Furthermore, the increase in the share of young people coincided with increasing 
social and political conflict, and, in response to this, democratisation and more 
extensive state intervention. In the late 19th century Sweden, modern ideas about 
public health, social security, protective labour legislation, urban housing, vocational 
education, etc. were launched, and these policies, designed to deal with the multiple 
risks, dangers and possibilities of early industrialisation, would later form the basis 
for more comprehensive welfare state policies.23  
Few would at once be willing to ascribe these rapid changes to the 
increase of the young adult population. However, if we look at other countries 
experiencing a similar demographic transformation, it is striking that we in these 
cases also find examples of countries undergoing very rapid economic change. 
England, for example, between 1800 and 1900, Germany between 1870 and 1930, 
China from 1965 to 1995 and Algeria from 1980 and onwards.24 The list can easily 
                                          
23  L. Jörberg, ”Structural Change and Economic Growth: Sweden in the 19th Century”, in P. K. Brien (ed.), The 
Industrial Revolutions in Europe, vol. 5 of The Industrial Revolutions series, Oxford, 1994; H. Lindgren, 
”Finanssektorn och dess aktörer 1860-1992”, in Äventyret Sverige. En ekonomisk och social historia, Stockholm, 
1993; K. Ohrlander, I barnens och nationens intresse, Stockholm, 1992; S. Olsson, Social Policy and Welfare State in 
Sweden, Lund, 1990; Sommestad, ”Welfare State Attitudes to the Male Breadwinning System ”, B. Stråth, 
”Industriborgerskapets roll i den svenska samhällsomvandlingen”, in K. Kjeldstadli et al. (eds.) Formeringen av 
industrisamfunnet i Norden fram till 1920, Oslo, 1994, p. 29-46. 
24 B. R. Mitchell, International Historical Statistics, Europe 1750-1988, Stockton, 1992, p. 21-22, 41-43; United 
Nations, Global Estimates and Projections of Populations by Sex and Age: the 1994 revision, United Nations, New 
York, 1994.   14
be extended. As it seems, the "chock of modernity" is closely associated with a 
particular demographic situation, the young adult phase.25  
In fact, many historians have argued that young people played a 
remarkably prominent role in Europeans history during this period. The Swedish 
historian Henrik Berggren, for example, observes that youth associations 
proliferated in Europe at the time, and parallel to this, a discourse on youth and 
adolescence had a powerful impact on political and cultural debates. Youthfulness 
was increasingly associated with energy, purity, modernity and progress. In the early 
20
th century, he notes, Swedish society was seemingly completely pervaded by 
enthusiasm for the youth of the nation.26 
The strong increase in the adult working population, that marked the 
period, has also attracted the attention of a long row of economists and challenged 
them to theorise about the possible relationship between population dynamics and 
economic change. A classic analysis is Simon Kuznets’ discussion about 
population growth and economic development in the time of the industrial 
revolutions, Modern Economic Growth (1966).27 
Kuznets argued that population growth in the Western world during the 
late 19th and early 20th centuries had largely positive effects. The most important 
reason, he noted, was precisely the fact that population growth in this period 
resulted in a more favourable age structure. In contrast to the earlier phase, when 
children dominated population growth, a growing share of people was now in the 
most productive years. Second, the decline in infant- and child mortality, that 
                                          
25 Compare A. Pred, Lost words and lost worlds : modernity and the language of everyday life in late nineteenth-
century Stockholm , Cambridge, MA, 1990. 
26 H. Berggren, Seklets ungdom. Retorik, politik och modernitet 1900-1939, Stockholm, 1995, p. 11-51. 
27 S. Kuznets, Modern Economic Growth. Rate, Structure and Spread, New Haven and London, 1969.   15
marked this stage of the demographic transition, eliminated the waste involved in 
rearing large number of infants that died before they could themselves contribute to 
the production and welfare of society. Furthermore, lower birth rates and a decline 
in infant mortality reduced the domestic work of women, and thus released women 
for gainful occupations. Third, according to Kuznets, the decline in death rates was 
related to a lower incidence of disease, and with improving health, it could be 
expected that the productivity of the population increased. Fourth, following the 
classic argument of Adam Smith, Kuznets pointed to the greater opportunities for 
economies of scale, and he also noted the broader scope for venturesome 
entrepreneurial undertakings and the more plentiful stock of possible contributors to 
the stock of knowledge.28 These arguments of Kuznets can easily be extended. For 
example, a growing young adult population will make investments in communication 
and infrastructure more profitable and increase the demand for housing. 
However, in contrast to Kuznets’ largely positive view, a strong 
scholarly tradition has also pointed to possibly negative consequences of a growing, 
young labour force. The most influential thinker in this tradition is of course Robert 
Malthus, who formulated his influential theory about overpopulation already in the 
late 18th century. Malthus argued that in the wake of population growth, wages 
would be driven down and marriages postponed. Following Malthus, in the 1880s, 
the Swedish economist Knut Wicksell argued that population growth was in the 
main negative for the wellbeing of a population. According to Wicksell, phenomena 
such as emigration, low living standards, social discontent and low levels of moral 
were all caused by a disproportionate increase in the labour force. Knut Wicksell 
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and other neo-classical economists maintained that there was an optimal population 
for a given level of technology and available natural resources.29 
In view of the typical life cycle pattern, it is actually not surprising that 
observations from the young adult phase show a largely positive macro-economic 
development, mixed with reports about individual economic hardships and political 
instability. In contrast to children, young adults can support themselves with their 
labour. This favours economic development. However, young people are in general 
less stable than older citizens are: they are more mobile, lack life experience, earn 
less, and have a limited capacity to generate savings. Furthermore, it is probable that 
a large increase in the share of young, less experienced labour will push down the 
relative wages of this age group, while the growing need for investments, not least in 
housing and infrastructure, will drive up the price of capital. Income inequality and 
inflationary pressures may follow.30 
As we will soon see, more stable economic conditions characterise the 
third phase of the age transition, the phase of population maturity. In Sweden this 
phase started around 1870 and continued up to about 1970. The increase of the 
middle-aged group was particularly strong in the period 1920 to 1960 (see figure 1 
above). In Great Britain, Australia and Canada the phase of population maturity 
started somewhat earlier, and in the United States the relative expansion of the 
middle-aged group took off already in the mid-19
th century. In Denmark, 
Switzerland, Germany, and Belgium the time pattern was similar to Sweden's, while 
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the expansion of middle aged in Italy, the Netherlands, and Norway did not start 
until the inter-war years. All in all, the rapid expansion of the middle-aged group in 
the industrialised world is largely a 20th-century phenomenon.31 
Outside the western world, Japan was the first country to enter the phase 
of population maturity. Here, the share of the middle-aged population has been 
growing from the 1950s to the early 1990s. In Korea the share of the middle-aged 
population has been growing from the end of the 1960s, and in Chile, Mexico and 
Thailand since the early 1970s. In Brazil, Colombia and China the expansion of the 
middle-aged group started about 1980, whereas for example in Morocco, India and 
Vietnam it started as late as in the early 1990s. Countries that have not yet entered 
this third phase of the age transition include a number of sub-Saharan states such as 
Tanzania, Uganda and Mozambique.32 
If we look for common characteristics among countries that have 
entered the phase of population maturity, the most obvious choice would be 
sustained economic growth. Countries that for a number of decades have benefited 
from increases in the middle-aged group seem without exception to have entered the 
club of industrialised countries. An increase in the group of middle-aged people is 
thus clearly associated with a more developed stage of economic growth, a stage 
that the economist Walt Rostow once designated ”the drive to maturity”.33 
As regards Sweden, the phase of population maturity overlaps almost 
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exactly with the most successful period of economic growth. Between 1920 and 
1970 the Swedish GNP per capita grew by almost 400%. The average annual 
growth rate was 3.2 %. This compares to a 1.1% annual growth rate in the fifty 
years before 1920 and a 1.6% annual growth rate from 1970 to 2000.34 In view of 
this tremendous rate of growth, it is important to note that this was also the period, 
when the work force participation among Swedish women decreased markedly. In 
the 1950s it eventually reached its lowest level ever, slightly above 40 percent. This 
was the short ”era of the housewife” in Swedish history.35  
Possible causal factors behind the correlation between middle-aged 
people and economic growth are not yet fully clarified. However, observations of 
economies that pass through the phase of population maturity fit well with the 
micro-economic characteristics of middle aged people. One important factor is 
savings behaviour. When people enter this part of the life cycle, they tend to save 
more, and in addition, they increasingly switch their investments from housing, for 
example, to financial assets. This is important for industrial investments. Another 
factor is long life experience and well-developed social networks among the middle 
aged. It can be expected that this type of capacity, that we may label ”human 
capital”, is of great importance in modern industrial economies.36 As regards 
women's low work force participation in this period, it is likely that low youth- and 
old age dependency rates makes it possible to do without married women's gainful 
labour. With an ample labour supply, women can more easily focus on domestic 
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chores and child rearing.37 
It should be noted, finally, that the phase of population maturity in 
Sweden coincided with the height of the ”Swedish model”, 1930-1970. In view of 
the age composition of the Swedish population during this successful phase of 
welfare institutionalisation, it is worth noting that Sweden in this period could benefit 
not only from low dependency rates and high rates of economic growth, but also 
from a large stock of knowledge and experience. It has often been emphasised that 
an extraordinary spirit of consensus and constructive collaboration, not least 
between employers and trade unions, marked the classic Swedish model. It is 
unlikely that this feature of the Swedish model was unrelated to the rich human 
resources and the remarkably high share of experienced people in the population.38 
The final phase of the age transition, the phase of ageing, is largely a 
late 20
th century phenomenon. The first country to enter this phase was Great 
Britain, that already by 1914 was experiencing an increase in the share of older age 
groups. In the inter-war years the expansion started in Australia, Austria, Belgium, 
Germany, and Switzerland, and in these countries (with Australia as an exception) 
the relative expansion of the old age group continued into the post-war period. In 
Sweden, as well as in the other Scandinavian countries, the growth in the share of 
old aged did not accelerate until after World War II. However, once the process of 
ageing had begun in Sweden, it was remarkably rapid, and up to 1990, no other 
industrialised welfare state has had such a pronounced ageing process as Sweden.39 
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In recent years, a number of countries in Asia and Latin America have also entered 
the phase of ageing. In Japan the share of people above 60 years of age has been 
growing rapidly since about 1980. In Korea as well as in Thailand the share of old 
aged has started to grow in the 1990s, and towards 2010, the process of ageing will 
accelerate. In Chile, Brazil and China, the old age group has begun to increase and 
will accelerate further in the next two decades.40 
Thanks to good availability of comparative data for recent decades, 
collected by the OECD, it is relatively easy to find out how the expansion of the old 
age group is correlated with macro-economic phenomena. Two features stand out. 
First, ageing countries have experienced a decline in economic growth, along with a 
number of related negative economic trends. Thus, statistical analyses of OECD 
data show that there is a negative association between, on the one hand, the share of 
people aged 60 and above, and, on the other hand, per capita income growth, 
productivity growth, rate of capital formation in the business sector, foreign 
balance, and housing investments. Ageing is also associated with increasing long-
term interest rates. If we differentiate between different groups of old aged, people 
above 80 years of age stand out as particularly costly. 41 
Second, population ageing in the OECD countries has been closely 
connected with growing public expenditure and budget deficits. There is thus a 
strong positive association between, on the one hand, the share of people aged 60 
and above, and, on the other hand, government consumption, public sector 
employment, public debt, and taxes paid. All in all, these correlations indicate that 
the old age phase of the age transition is associated with a major structural shift in 
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the economy away from a traditional high-growth industrialised economy towards 
an economically less vigorous welfare state. If the results are compared to life cycle 
behaviour, it is evident that the decreasing productive capacity, that marks individual 
ageing, translates to the macro economy as well.42  
In Sweden, with its pronounced process of ageing from the 1970s 
onwards, the correlation between ageing and welfare state growth is evident indeed. 
In particular, expenditures for old age care and services, health care, and childcare 
have expanded. Parallel to this, women's labour force participation has increased, 
and in particular within the public sector, part time work has become 
institutionalised. In contrast to the 1940s and the 1950s, very few Swedish women 
are today fully occupied as homemakers. 43 
In some respects, this last phase of the age transition is similar to the 
first, the phase of child abundance. From a theoretical point of view this is not 
surprising, since both the earliest and the last phase of the life cycle are 
characterised by a deficit productive capacity. There are, however important 
differences. The old-age phase of the transition comes after a period of strong 
economic growth and, therefore, it is not likely that it will generate mass-poverty. 
Another difference is that in the child abundant period subsistence problems are 
largely left to be coped with by individual families on their own. This is not so in the 
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old-age phase when public institutions and public transfers of income play a much 
larger role for the redistribution of resources between people of different ages, and 
also between regions. 
However, it remains to be seen whether societies with increasingly older 
populations will be able to sustain and develop existing institutions for redistribution 
between generations. If we look more closely at educational and social policies in 
ageing societies, tendencies of increased conflict around available tax resources can 
no doubt be found. In Sweden, for example, there have lately been signs of a 
growing political incapability to comply with the needs and demands of youth and 
children. During the 1990s, when Sweden experienced a severe economic crisis, 
children and young people were in many respects more hardly hit than older citizens 
were.44  
To conclude, the debate about how population change affects 
economic and social development has always been a hot topic in the social 
sciences. On the one hand, there has been the Malthusian view that emphasises the 
negative effects of population growth. This strand of thought has been remarkably 
strong, and it has gained additional support during the extraordinarily rapid world 
population growth after World War II. On the other hand, there has been a smaller 
group, sometimes labelled ”population optimists”, who have argued that population 
growth is an important positive factor in economic growth. To this group belongs 
Simon Kuznets, together with the influential Danish economist Ester Boserup, who 
convincingly has argued that the introduction of new technology is closely linked to 
the size of the resident population.45 
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Clearly, both ”population pessimists” and ”population optimists” have 
been able to put forward empirical studies that support their positions. These 
seemingly contradictory empirical results have led some scholars to conclude that 
population growth has in fact only few – or weak – effects on economic 
development, and from this "neutralist" position, the conclusion has been drawn that 
major explanations for long-term historical change should be sought elsewhere. 
However, our argument in this paper is that population dynamics must still be 
considered as a main driving force behind historical change, and that the seemingly 
contradictory results of earlier research disappear, if we introduce age structure as 
an analytical category. In short: the effects of population growth depend on which 
age groups that are involved. Population growth dominated by children will have 
Malthusian effects on the subsistence situation. Population growth dominated by 
increases in the middle age groups, on the other hand, will have the favourable 
effects that population optimists proclaim.  
One way to demonstrate the importance of taking age structure into 
account is to use Edward A. Wrigley’s and Roger Schofield’s classical data set on 
the English population to look at the impact of population growth on real wages. In 
these data there is some evidence of a Malthusian mechanism, but the pattern is in 
no way clear-cut. For quite long periods, notably the early 17
th century and in the 
19
th century, there is – in contradiction with the Malthusian model – a simultaneous 
increase in both population and the real wages. Thus, the Malthusian model cannot 
be upheld as a general model although it seems to account for some patterns in the 
data. A general solution to this problem has been to propose the existence of a 
Malthusian regime during periods when a Malthusian correlation is found and to 
proclaim the end of the Malthusian regime when the correct correlation fails to show 
up.    24
If changes in the age structure are taken into account these difficulties 
are greatly diminished. Wrigley’s and Schofield’s data show that during the whole of 
the 1541 to 1871 period the English population have undergone several cycles of 
age structure change. If these changes in the age structure are correlated with the real 
wage index it becomes evident that real wages have been high when there have been 
large increases in the middle-aged population (30-64 years). There is also, fully in 
accordance with the Malthusian paradigm, a negative correlation between the share 
of young adults and the real wage. Moreover, these correlations are valid for the 
entire 1541 to 1871 period. This implies that with age structure changes taken into 
account there is no longer any pressing need to formulate different models for 
different historical periods.  
Moreover, a consideration of age effects might explain why population 
optimists often rely on long run data when the want to demonstrate the positive 
impact of population growth. 46 Thus, in Wrigley’s and Schofield’s data, it is only 
increases in the middle-aged population that is associated with high real wages. In 
the short run, however, population growth is associated with increasing numbers of 
children and young adults. Therefore, optimists may come into trouble when they 
are confronted with fresh examples of rapid population growth. 47 The post Second-
World War experience in Asia and Africa is a case in point. In the wake of 
constantly rising youth dependency rates, many countries in Asia and Africa 
experienced remarkable economic setbacks. Only recently have falling birth rates 
turned the tide, so that population growth increasingly goes together with economic 
progress. 
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Taken together, our analysis of the age transition in Sweden and 
elsewhere suggests that age structure changes have played a potent role in macro-
economic processes of change. We do not argue here that the multiple phenomena 
discussed in this article – such as poverty, urbanisation, economic growth, or 
welfare state expansion – are fully explained by demographic factors alone. 
However, we do argue that in view of the very limited interest that has hitherto been 
given this potentially fruitful field of research, more studies are indeed needed – not 
only in order to understand our past, but also in order to see where we are now 
going.  
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